Fragmentation of Political Authority, Centralized Planning, and Highway Lobby Interests

How Does Fragmentation of Political Authority, Centralized Planning, and Highway Lobbying Interests Affect Public Transportation?

Case studies at various levels of government examine the formal organizational changes in units of transportation planning (Davis, 1965; cited in Yago, 1983). The proliferation of governmental units dealing with transportation blocked diversified transportation development (Levin and Abend, 1971; cited in Yago, 1983). The fragmentation of political authority over transportation planning through the establishment of special transportation districts, regional planning authorities, state highway departments, and federal financing policies sedulously centralized planning and subordinated intra-urban travel to inter-metropolitan transportation and suburban-central city commuting (Morehouse, 1965; Weber, 1974; US Department of Transportation, 1976; Mantel, 1971; cited in Yago, 1983). Inter-organizational conflicts in transportation planning among local, regional, and federal governmental units resulted usually in the larger, more centralized unit's dominance. Moreover, the increasing regional, state, and federal power over transportation decisions permitted wide-scale penetration of planning by highway lobby interests (constructors, highway engineers, auto manufacturers, and trucking companies) (Leavitt, 1970; cited in Yago, 1983).

State and regional planning organizations acted in the 1960s and 1970s to circumvent opposition to highway construction (Cottingham, 1973; Fellman, 1972), regressively finance transit (Marcuse, 1978), maintain or create locational advantages within the metropolitan region through dominating route planning (Adler, 1980), and control overall transportation development in the face of changing economic structural conditions (e.g. the energy crisis) and conflicting proposals from opposing groups (Whitt, 1982; Yago, 1980; cited in Yago, 1983).